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Abstract 
Delegation of rights is promising in Internet applications like distributed computing, e-cash systems, global 
distribution networks, grid computing, mobile agent applications, and mobile communications. This paper 
presents a novel Proxy Signcrypion Scheme based on hyper elliptic curves, attractive for resource constrained 
environment due to its shorter key size. It has properties of warrant integrity, message integrity, message 
confidentiality, warrant unforgeability, message unforgeability, proxy non repudiation and public verifiability. 
The proposed scheme has reduced computational cost as compared to the other existing schemes. 
Keywords: Proxy Communication; Proxy Signature; Proxy Signcrypion; Hyper Elliptic Curve. 
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1. Introduction  
Proxy communications play vital role in emerging internet environment and business processes, rights 
delegations for business organizations and enterprises. It helps in applications such as digital contract signing 
and online proxy auction. It has importance for resource constrained devices to transform heavy computational 
work from a low power device to a more powerful server. The term proxy signature was coined by Membo and 
his colleagues [1]. It enables the original user (Alice) to transfer his signing capability to another entity called 
proxy thus proxy signs messages on the behalf of the original user. Authentication is provided by digital 
signature and confidentiality is guaranteed by encryption algorithms. Signcrypion combines the functionality of 
digital signature and encryption in a single logical step [2].  
Gamage extended the concept of proxy signature and proposed a new cryptography primitive called proxy 
signcrypion [3]. Proxy signcrypion scheme allows the original user (Alice) to transfer the signing capability to 
the trusted entity known as proxy signcrypter. The proxy signer signcrypt the message on behalf of the original 
user and sends to the recipient (Bob) . Proxy Signcrypion schemes based on discrete logarithm problem (DLP) 
and elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) were proposed. The common problems of these schemes 
are high computational cost and more communication overhead. In this paper, proxy signcrypion based on hyper 
elliptic curve is proposed, whose security relies on the hardness of the hyper elliptic curve discrete logarithm 
problem (HECDLP). In order to achieve the same security level, NIST has recommended key length of 80 bits 
for HECC, 1024 bits for RSA and 160 bits for ECC. Hyper elliptic curve is of public key cryptosystem with 
small key length. The proposed scheme saves the computational and communication cost due to its shorter key 
size. The scheme achieves the security properties.  
1.1. Preliminaries 
Let 𝑞 be a prime number, where 𝑞 ≥ 280 and 𝐹𝑞is a finite field of order q. Hyperelliptic curve 𝐶(𝐹𝑞) over finite 
field 𝐹𝑞 be define the equation (1) 
𝐶: 𝑦2 + ℎ(𝑥)𝑦 = 𝑓(𝑥)mod𝑞        (1) 
Where ℎ(𝑥) ∈ 𝐹[𝑥]  is a polynomial and degreeℎ(𝑥) ≤ 𝑔  and 𝑓(𝑥) ∈ 𝐹[𝑥]  is a monic polynomial and degree 𝑓(𝑥) ≤ 2𝑔 + 1 . Unlike points on elliptic curve, the points on hyper elliptic curve do not form a group. 
Divisor 𝐷 is a finite formal sum of points on hyper elliptic curve and represented in mumford form as: 
𝐷 = �𝑢(𝑥), 𝑣(𝑥)� = ��𝑢𝑖𝑔
𝑖=0
𝑥𝑖 , �𝑣𝑖𝑔−1
𝑖=0
𝑥𝑖� 
Divisor form an Abelian group called Jacobian group 𝐽𝑐�𝐹𝑞�  and the order of Jacobian group 𝑜(𝐽𝑐�𝐹𝑞�) is 
defined as 
���𝑞 − 1�2𝑔� ≤ 𝑜(𝐽𝑐�𝐹𝑞�) ≤ ���𝑞 + 1�2𝑔� 
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1.2. Definition 
HECDLP 
Let 𝐷 be divisor of order 𝑛 in the Jacobian group 𝐽𝑐�𝐹𝑞�, find an integer 𝑥 ∈ 𝐹𝑞, such that : 
𝐷1 = 𝑥.𝐷 
1.3. Participants  
Signer (Alice): Signer signs the warrant and send to proxy.  
Proxy: Proxy signcrypts the message on behalf of the original signer and sends to the verifier. 
Verifier (Bob): The verifier checks the validity of signcrypted text and accepts or rejects it accordingly. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss the related work.  Section 3 discusses the 
proposed scheme , section 4 discusses the security analysis, section 5 discusses cost analysis and the last section 
is conclusion. 
2. Literature Review 
C. Gamage and his colleagues [3] Introduced first Proxy Signcrypion based on IF. The limitation of scheme is 
that it requires secure channel between signer and proxy. Y. Zhou and his colleagues [4] Introduced warrant-
based proxy signcrypion scheme based on integer factorization assumption. The scheme required secured 
channel between signer and proxy. H. Elkamchouchi and his colleagues [5] Proposed a New Proxy Signcrypion 
scheme with DSA verifier based on the work of Shin DSA verifiable signcrypion.  
The proposed scheme provides the property like public verifiability; authentication, signature and confidentiality 
are achieved through an unsecured channel. H. Elkamchouchi and his colleagues [6] introduced a new proxy 
signcrypion scheme based on the combination of hard problems: i.e. IFP, DLP, DHP, and irreversibility of a 
One-Way Hash Function (OWHF). The authors claimed that the combination of these hard problems provides 
strong security as compared to existing schemes. M. Elkamchouchi and his colleagues [7] introduced two proxy 
signcrypion schemes based on two different hard problems. The first one is based on Discrete Logarithm 
Problem (DLP) and the second one is based on elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP). The 
computational complexity is smaller than the other schemes in the literature. 
3. Proposed Scheme 
Our scheme consists of six phases: setup phase, key generation phase, proxy key generation phase, proxy key 
verification phase, signcrypion phase, and Unsigncryption phase. 
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3.1. Setup  
There exists a system authority (SA) whose tasks are to initialize the system and to manage the public directory 
as: 
Select and publish the following parameters: 
• 𝐶: Secure Hyperelliptic curve C 
• D:Divisor of prime order n ≥ 280 
• ψ ∶ Jc�Fq� ⟶ Zq be a mapping function used to map Jacobian group element to an integer. 
• h: a one way hash function 
• m/c: message/ciphertext 
• Ek/ Dk: Symmetric encryption/decryption using session key k 
• ⊥: message is not encrypted or signed correctly 
3.2. Key Generation 
Alice, Proxy, Bob generate their private keys and compute their respective public keys as: 
Alice: Selects a random number 𝑥𝑎 ∈ {0, 1, 2, … . . , 𝑞 − 1}as his private key and computes public key 𝑌𝑎: 𝑌𝑎 = 𝑥𝑎𝐷. 
Proxy Signer: Selects a random number 𝑥𝑝 ∈ {0, 1, 2, … . . , 𝑞 − 1}as his private key and computes public key 
𝑌𝑝:𝑌𝑝 =  𝑥𝑝𝐷. 
Bob: Selects a random number 𝑥𝑏 ∈ {0, 1, 2, … . . , 𝑞 − 1} as his private key and computes public key 𝑌𝑏:𝑌𝑏 = 𝑥𝑏𝐷. 
3.3. Proxy key generation 
In this phase Alice signs a warrant message and sends to proxy. 
Alice 
• Randomly chose 𝑑 
• Compute (𝛼,𝛽) = 𝑇 = 𝑑.𝐷 
• Compute 𝛾 = �𝑑 − 𝑥𝑎. ℎ(𝛼,𝑚𝑤)�𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑛 
Send (𝛼, 𝛾,𝑚𝑤)  to proxy 
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3.4. Proxy key verification phase 
Proxy checks the validity of warrant message, whether the message is sent by the original signer or not. If the 
message is from original signer then accepts it otherwise rejects it. 
Proxy 
• Compute  𝑇′ = 𝛾.𝐷 + ℎ(𝛼,𝑚𝑤).𝑌𝑎 
3.5. Proxy Signcrypion phase 
In this phase the Proxy Signcrypt a message on behalf of the original user (Alice). 
Proxy 
1. Compute 𝑠𝑘𝑝 = �𝑥𝑝 + 𝛾�𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑞 
2. Randomly chosen 𝑤 ∈ {0,1,2, … . .𝑛} 
3. Compute (𝑘1||𝑘2) = 𝐾 = 𝑤.𝑌𝑏𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑛 
4. Compute 𝑐 = 𝐸𝑘1(𝑚) 
5. Compute 𝑟 = ℎ(𝑚, 𝑘2) 
6. Compute 𝑠 = (𝑤 − 𝑟 ∗ 𝑠𝑘𝑝) 
7. Send ( 𝑐, 𝛾,𝑚𝑤,𝛼, 𝑠, 𝑟) to verifier 
3.6. Unsigncryption phase 
In proxy Unsigncryption phase only the verifier (Bob) can recover the plain text from cipher text. 
Bob 
1. Compute (𝑘1 , 𝑘2) = 𝐾 =  𝑠.𝑌𝑏 +  𝑟 ∗ 𝑥𝑏(𝑇 + 𝑌𝑝 − ℎ(𝛼,𝑚𝑤).𝑌𝑎) 
2. Compute 𝑚 = 𝐷𝑘1(𝑐) 
3. Compute 𝑟′ = ℎ(𝑚, 𝑘2) 
4. Accept if 𝑟′ = 𝑟  
4. Security Analysis 
The proposed scheme ensures the confidentiality, warrant integrity, message integrity, warrant unforgeability, 
message unforgeability, sender non- repudiation, and sender public verifiability. 
4.1. Confidentiality 
In our scheme, if the attacker wants to derive the original message, he must get the secret key K. There are many 
cases that the attacker can try to derive the secret key K.  
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Case 1: if the attacker computes K from Eq (1), then he needs secret parameter w. However, he has to solve 
HECDLP first, as he just knows the point𝑌𝑏 , It which is computationally infeasible for the attacker to get the 
point K from Eq.(1) 
𝐾 = 𝑤.𝑌𝑏         (1) 
Case 2: The attacker can get w from Eq (2). In this case the attacker needs the private key of proxy 𝑥𝑝 . To 
calculate proxy's private key, one has to solve the HECDHP as follows: 
𝑠 = (𝑤 − 𝑟 ∗ 𝑠𝑘𝑝)  (2) 
𝑟 = ℎ(𝑚, 𝑘2)            (3) 
𝑠𝑘𝑝 = �𝑥𝑝 + 𝛾�      (4) 
4.2. Warrant Integrity 
 Our proposed scheme provides warrant integrity. The sender calculates hash function  ℎ(𝛼,𝑚𝑤) of the warrant 
and sends to the proxy. If the attacker changes 𝑚𝑤 into 𝑚𝑤′. 𝑙𝑒𝑡ℎ′(𝛼,𝑚𝑤′) then he constructs 𝛾 using Eq. (5). 
Thus the attacker finds the private key 𝑥𝑖 of the sender from Eq. (6) and random number 𝑑 from Eq. (7). To 
generate 𝑥𝑖  and 𝑑 is equivalent to solve two HECDLP which is computationally infeasible for attacker. For 
integrity the proxy checks the equality of Eq. (8), if the equation satisfies then warrant can’t change. 
𝛾 = �𝑑 − 𝑥𝑖 . ℎ(𝛼,𝑚𝑤)�   (5) 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖 .𝐷                             (6) 
𝑇 = 𝑑.𝐷                              (7) 
𝑇 = 𝛾.𝐷 + ℎ(𝛼,𝑚𝑤)      (8) 
4.3. Message integrity 
The proxy calculates the digest/ hash function 𝑟 = ℎ(𝑚, 𝑘2) of the message𝑚, and sends to the recipient. If the 
attacker changes the original cipher text C to C′, the related message is changed to 𝑚′. Let𝑟′ = ℎ(𝑚′, 𝑘2). By 
the property of one-way hash function, it is computationally infeasible for the attacker to modify C to C′. The 
recipient can check the integrity of the message by comparing 𝑟′ = 𝑟 then there is no change in the message and 
message from original sender. 
4.4. Warrant unforgeability 
 In our scheme the attacker can’t generate the valid signature for warrant without the private key of sender. To 
162 
 
International Journal of Computer (IJC) (2016) Volume 20, No  1, pp 157-166 
generate valid signature from Eq. (5) the attacker needs the random number 𝑑 and private key of sender 𝑥𝑖. To 
find sender's private key 𝑥𝑖 from Eq. (6) and 𝑑 from Eq. (7) as complex as to solve two HECDLP which is 
computationally infeasible. 
4.5. Message unforgeability 
In our scheme only proxy generates a valid signature for message. When attacker/ verifier generates a valid 
signature for message then he gets private key of proxy 𝑥𝑝 from Eq (8)  and session key 𝐾from Eq (11). 
Attacker 
𝑌𝑝 = 𝑥𝑝 .𝐷                            (8) 
𝑠 = (𝑤 − 𝑟 ∗ 𝑠𝑘𝑝)             (9) 
𝑠𝑘𝑝 = �𝑥𝑝 + 𝛾�𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑛      (10) 
Verifier (Recipient) 
𝑠 = (𝑤 − 𝑟 ∗ 𝑠𝑘𝑝)           (9) 
𝐾 = 𝑤.𝑌𝑣𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑛                 (11) 
4.6. Sender non repudiation 
 When dispute occurs between sender and proxy then trusted third party/judge verifies and decides that warrant 
𝑚𝑤 is from the sender or not. The proxy provides (𝑇, 𝛾,𝑚𝑤)  to the third party/judge. The judge performs the 
following steps: 
• Verifies sender's public key 𝑌𝑖 by using certificate. 
• Uses the one-way hash function to generate ℎ(𝛼,𝑚𝑤). 
• If(𝑌𝑖 = 𝑇 − 𝛾.𝐷/ℎ(𝛼,𝑚𝑤)) from Eq. (12) then the sender has sent (𝑇, 𝛾,𝑚𝑤) to the proxy; otherwise not. 
𝑇 = 𝛾.𝐷 + ℎ(𝛼,𝑚𝑤).𝑌𝑖      (12) 
4.7. Sender public verifiability 
The proposed scheme provides sender public verification. Using Eq. (13) anybody can verify that warrant 𝑚𝑤 is 
sent by the valid sender or not. 
�𝑌𝑖 = 𝑇 − 𝛾. 𝐷ℎ(𝛼,𝑚𝑤)�         (13) 
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5.  Scheme Correctness Analysis 
In this section we analyze the correction proofs of proposed scheme. 
5.1. Proof 01 
The following equations show the correctness between sender and proxy. 
𝛾.𝐷 + ℎ(𝛼,𝑚𝑤).𝑌𝑎 
= �𝑑 − 𝑥𝑎 . ℎ(𝛼,𝑚𝑤)�.𝐷 + ℎ(𝛼,𝑚𝑤).𝑌𝑎 
= �𝑑 − 𝑥𝑎 . ℎ(𝛼,𝑚𝑤)�.𝐷 + ℎ(𝛼,𝑚𝑤). 𝑥𝑎 .𝐷 
= 𝐷(�𝑑 − 𝑥𝑎 . ℎ(𝛼,𝑚𝑤)�. +ℎ(𝛼,𝑚𝑤). 𝑥𝑎)  
= 𝐷(𝑑 − 𝑥𝑎 . ℎ(𝛼,𝑚𝑤) + 𝑥𝑎 . ℎ(𝛼,𝑚𝑤)) 
= 𝐷(𝑑 − 𝑥𝑎 . ℎ(𝛼,𝑚𝑤) + 𝑥𝑎 . ℎ(𝛼,𝑚𝑤)) 
= 𝑑.𝐷 = 𝑇 
5.2. Proof 02 
The following equations show the correctness between proxy and verifier. 
𝑠.𝑌𝑏 +  𝑐 ∗ 𝑥𝑏(𝑇 + 𝑌𝑝 − ℎ(𝛼,𝑚𝑤).𝑌𝑎) 
= (𝑤 − 𝑐 ∗ 𝑠𝑘𝑝). 𝑥𝑏 .𝐷 + 𝑐 ∗ 𝑥𝑏�𝑑.𝐷 + 𝑥𝑝 .𝐷 − ℎ(𝛼,𝑚𝑤). 𝑥𝑎 .𝐷� 
= (𝑤 − 𝑐 ∗ 𝑠𝑘𝑝). 𝑥𝑏 .𝐷 + 𝑐 ∗ 𝑥𝑏 .𝐷�𝑑 + 𝑥𝑝 − ℎ(𝛼,𝑚𝑤). 𝑥𝑎� 
= 𝑥𝑏 .𝐷(𝑤 − 𝑐 ∗ 𝑠𝑘𝑝) + 𝑐�𝑑 + 𝑥𝑝 − ℎ(𝛼,𝑚𝑤). 𝑥𝑎� 
= 𝑥𝑏 .𝐷(𝑤 − 𝑐 ∗ 𝑠𝑘𝑝 + 𝑐𝑑 + 𝑐𝑥𝑝 − 𝑐ℎ(𝛼,𝑚𝑤). 𝑥𝑎) 
= 𝑥𝑏 .𝐷(𝑤 − 𝑐�𝑠𝑘𝑝 − 𝑑 − 𝑥𝑝 + ℎ(𝛼,𝑚𝑤). 𝑥𝑎�) 
= 𝑥𝑏 .𝐷(𝑤 − 𝑐�𝑠𝑘𝑝 − 𝑥𝑝 − (𝑑 − ℎ(𝛼,𝑚𝑤). 𝑥𝑎�) 
= 𝑥𝑏 .𝐷(𝑤 − 𝑐�𝑠𝑘𝑝 − 𝑥𝑝 − 𝛾�) 
= 𝑥𝑏 .𝐷(𝑤 − 𝑐 ∗ �𝑥𝑝 + 𝛾 − 𝑥𝑝 − 𝛾�) 
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= 𝑥𝑏 .𝐷 ∗ (𝑤) 
= 𝑤 ∗ 𝑥𝑏 .𝐷 
= 𝑤.𝑌𝑏  = 𝐾 
6. Cost analysis 
In this section we analyze and compare two types of costs; computational cost and communication overhead of 
the proposed proxy signcryption scheme and existing proxy signcryption scheme. 
6.1. Computational cost 
The computational cost means the amount of  computational eﬀorts to be invested both by the sender and 
recipient of a message. Generally, the computational cost is estimated by counting the number of dominant 
operations involved. Typically these operations include private key encryption and decryption, hashing, modular 
addition, multiplication, division and exponentiation The Elliptic curve point Multiplication (ECPM) and hyper-
elliptic curve divisors scalar multiplication (HECDM) are is the most costly operations.The proposed scheme is 
compared and analyzed in terms of HECPM (most expensive operation) with the existing scheme.It is observed 
that the single scalar multiplication  consumes 4.24 ms for elliptic curve point multiplication (ECPM) and 2.2 
ms for hyper elliptic curve divisors scalar multiplication (HECDM) on a PC running jdk 1.6 having two cores of 
Intel CPU with processing speed of 2.00 GHz and primary memory capacity of 4 GB operating with Microsoft 
Windows vista [8]. The Figure 1 shows the comparative computation cost of proxy signcrypion vs proposed 
proxy Signcryption. 
 
Figure 1: Computational Cost Comparison 
6.2 Communication cost 
Communication cost depends on the choice of parameters and amount of information and is calculated as the 
size of plain text vs signcrypted text in bits of existing proxy signcrypion and proposed proxy signcrypion 
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scheme. The Figure 2 shows the Comparative Communication overhead analysis of proxy signcrypion vs 
proposed proxy signcrypion. 
7. Conclusion 
This paper presents an efficient proxy signcrypion based on hyper elliptic curves. As compared to previous 
schemes the proposed scheme reduces 48% computation cost and 27% communication overhead. The scheme is 
suitable for devices in resource constrained environments due hyper elliptic curve cryptosystem's shorter key 
size. The proposed scheme also achieves the security properties like Confidentiality, Warrant Integrity, Warrant 
unforgeability, Message integrity, Message unforgeability, Sender non repudiation, Sender public verifiability. 
 
Figure 2: Communication Overhead Analysis 
References 
[1] M. Mambo, K. Usuda, and E. Okamoto, “Proxy signatures for delegating signing operation,” Proc. 3rd 
ACM Conf. Comput. Commun. Secur. - CCS ’96, pp. 48–57, 1996. 
[2] Y. Zheng, “Digital Signcryption or How to     Achieve Cost (Signature and Encryption) Cost (Signature) + 
Cost (Encryption),” Advances in Cryptology, LNCS, Vol. 1294. Springer-Verlag, pp.165–179, 1997. 
[3] C. Gamage, J. Leiwo, and Y. Zheng, “An Efficient Scheme for Secure Message Transmission using 
Proxy-Signcryption,” in Proceedings of the 22nd Australasian Computer Science Conference ,pp.420-
431, Springer,1999. 
[4] Y. Zhou, Z. Cao, and R. Lu, “Constructing Secure Warrant-Based Proxy Signcryption Schemes,” pp. 
172–185, 2005. 
[5] D. H. Elkamshoushy, a. K. AbouAlsoud, and M. Madkour, “New proxy signcryption scheme with DSA 
verifier,” Natl. Radio Sci. Conf. NRSC, Proc., no. Nrsc, 2006. 
[6] H. Elkamchouchi, “Based on a Combination of Hard Problems,” no. October, pp. 5123–5127, 2009. 
[7] E. F. A. Elkhair, “An Efficient Proxy Signcryption Scheme,” vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 7–19, 2013. 
[8] R. Ganesan and M. Gobi, “E-Commerce Channel 4 Hyper-Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems.” Int J Netw 
Secur 11(3):121–127,2010. 
166 
 
